In re Williams Securities Litigation—WCG Subclass: 
How Dura Met Daubert by Phipps, Bryan L.
BYU Law Review
Volume 2010 | Issue 1 Article 15
3-1-2010
In re Williams Securities Litigation—WCG
Subclass: How Dura Met Daubert
Bryan L. Phipps
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Securities Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bryan L. Phipps, In re Williams Securities Litigation—WCG Subclass: How Dura Met Daubert, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 215 (2010).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2010/iss1/15
DO NOT DELETE 3/6/2010 2:19 PM 
 
215 
In re Williams Securities Litigation—WCG Subclass: 
How Dura Met Daubert 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
recently decided a large securities fraud case that will have a 
significant impact on evidentiary standards pertaining to loss 
causation theories. The court’s February 18, 2009, opinion was its 
first to apply the Supreme Court’s loss causation standard set forth in 
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo.1 The case, In re Williams 
Securities Litigation—WCG Subclass,2 addressed the question of 
whether the district court abused its discretion in granting summary 
judgment to the defendants on the issue of loss causation after 
excluding the plaintiffs’ expert witness testimony. The court 
excluded the expert’s testimony on the ground that his loss causation 
scenarios were based on an unreliable methodology.3  
In deciding Williams, the Tenth Circuit became the first federal 
appellate court to consider Dura’s requirements in response to a 
Daubert challenge. After juxtaposing Dura’s standards with those set 
forth by Daubert and its progeny, the appellate court affirmed both 
the lower court’s exclusion of the plaintiffs’ expert testimony and its 
grant of summary judgment for the defendants. Though the 
standards announced by the Tenth Circuit are more burdensome on 
plaintiffs than those imposed by other courts, Williams is more in 
line with the Supreme Court’s reasoning and policy underlying Dura 
than cases decided in other jurisdictions. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Factual Background 
Following the forced breakup of AT&T in the early 1980s,4 
WMB (an energy company that produces and transports natural gas) 
 
 1. 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 2. 558 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 3. Id. at 1132, 1143. 
 4. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub 
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
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planned to run fiber-optic cables through decommissioned 
pipelines.5 As part of this plan, WMB formed a telecommunications 
subsidiary called Williams Telecommunications Company 
(“WilTel”), which eventually constructed a nationwide digital fiber-
optic network of approximately 9,700 route miles.6  
In 1995, WMB sold WilTel for $2.5 billion to LDDS 
Communications.7 Excluded from the sale, among other things, was 
a single fiber-optic strand along the original nationwide network.8 As 
a condition of the sale, WMB agreed to a three year non-compete 
agreement that prevented it from reentering the telecommunications 
industry until 1998.9  
When WMB’s non-compete agreement expired in January 1998, 
the Telecom Index was thriving—up 42% since the beginning of the 
previous year.10 Seeking to reenter the telecommunications industry, 
WMB formed the subsidiary WCG with the objective of building a 
nationwide fiber-optic network for the exclusive purpose of 
providing services to communications service providers.11 By the end 
of the year, the Telecom Index climbed to 500.91, up 63%.12 
In light of the favorable market conditions and in an effort to 
raise additional capital for operations and continued network 
construction, WCG conducted an IPO on October 1, 1999.13 That 
day, WCG’s stock ended trading at $28.06 per share, and the 
Telecom Index reached 616.80 (a gain for the Index of 23% since 
the end of 1998).14 The months following WCG’s IPO showed 
exceptional growth for both WCG’s stock price and the Telecom 
Index, with WCG peaking on March 7, 2000, at $61.81 and the 
Telecom Index reaching its peak three days later at 1248.06.15 
 
 5. In re Williams Sec. Litig.—WCG Subclass, 496 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204 (N.D. 
Okla. 2007), aff’d, 558 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 1205. 
 13. See id. at 1206. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 1207. 
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Over the next several months, WCG and the Telecom Index 
both declined significantly.16 By July 21, 2000, WCG’s trading price 
was down to $29.38 (a decrease of more than 50% compared to its 
peak).17 Similarly, the Telecom Index had fallen an alarming 28% 
since its zenith.18 On July 24, 2000, the beginning of the class 
period, WMB announced its plan to spin off WCG in a tax free 
distribution to its shareholders.19 A November 16, 2000, press 
release quoted WMB’s CEO, defendant Keith Bailey, as saying: 
This important step continues a process that we believe remains in 
the best long-term interests of our shareholders. [WMB and WCG] 
have tremendous opportunities before them. Creating the most 
effective and efficient access to capital will help fuel that growth, 
and we believe that can best be achieved by creating two 
independent businesses.20 
Conversations among WMB’s board members revealed, 
however, that the real reason behind the spin-off was the board’s 
concern over how WCG was affecting WMB’s balance sheet: the 
massive capital expenditures necessary to keep WCG going were 
jeopardizing WMB’s credit rating and its ability to obtain financing 
to pursue its own business goals.21 Many board members saw the 
spin-off as an opportunity to “heave the junk called WCG overboard 
as fast as possible.”22 
Publicly, WMB extolled the strength and promise WCG enjoyed. 
Shareholders were told that WCG was “strongly positioned for 
success”23 and “pre-funded for their capital needs . . . to carry them 
to that point of EBITDA positive.”24 During a road show, executives 
continued to tout how the spin-off would fully allow each company 
to pursue its respective business strategies and increase access to 
capital, creating a “Win-Win for WMB and WCG shareholders.”25 
 
 16.  See id. at 1211. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 1216. 
 21. Id. at 1216–17. 
 22. Id. at 1217. 
 23. Id. at 1222. 
 24. Id. at 1281. 
 25. Id. at 1218, 1222. 
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WMB’s public statements painted a bright and promising future for 
WCG as an independent company. 
Within the company, however, the opinions regarding WCG’s 
ability to satisfy its capital needs were much more pessimistic. In 
September 2000, after WCG’s August sale of $1 billion in high yield 
bonds, WMB’s board of directors was told that, although the bond 
offering raised more capital than initially forecasted, WCG was still 
underfunded through the end of 2001 by approximately $800 
million.26 Bailey expressed his concerns when he declared that the 
company had no other choice but to go on a “capital diet” and sell 
off non-core assets.27 
After the spin-off on April 23, 2001, WCG continued to paint a 
rosy picture of the company’s present condition and future 
prospects.28 A couple months after the split, WCG’s CEO, defendant 
Howard Janzen, stated that WCG had funding in place to take the 
company to 2004, with a plan to be cash flow positive by the end of 
2003.29 Janzen also commented that the company was positioned to 
not only survive the market slowdown, but to thrive in the coming 
years.30 
Inside the company, the board members were receiving a 
different story. At an August presentation, WCG board members 
were told that the company was “very close to falling into a chasm of 
the red ‘danger’ zone” and that WCG’s cash flow was insufficient to 
service its debt.31 By the end of 2001, WCG’s stock price had fallen 
to $2.35 per share and the Telecom Index was down to 236.63.32 
The first quarter of 2002 consisted of devastating blow after 
devastating blow to WCG’s shareholders and WCG’s stock price. 
The most substantial releases of negative company information 
occurred on four separate occasions. On January 29, WMB 
announced that its 2001 earnings report would be delayed while the 
 
 26. Id. at 1212. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. at 1222 (“WCG is strongly positioned for success. Its core network asset is in 
place. It has demonstrated history of technical performance. And, it has the financial resources 
in place to enable it to deliver on the promise of a very bright future.”). 
 29. In re Williams Sec. Litig.—WCG Subclass, 558 F.3d 1130, 1133–34 (10th Cir. 
2009). 
 30. Id. at 1134. 
 31. In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1223. 
 32. Id. at 1224. 
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company assessed its contingent obligation with respect to WCG.33 
That same day, Milberg Weiss filed the Cali complaint—the first of 
the lawsuits against WCG (and later consolidated).34 WCG’s stock 
price fell that day from $1.63 to $1.34.35  
Just a few days later, a second major revelation occurred. On 
February 4, WCG announced that it was reviewing the potential 
impairment of its long-lived assets and that its lenders had recently 
informed WCG that the company may be in default under its credit 
agreement.36 As a result of the default notice, WCG agreed to submit 
a strategy for restructuring and deleveraging its balance sheet to the 
banks.37 WCG reassuringly added that “successful execution of the 
options currently envisioned does not include seeking bankruptcy 
protection or the substantial dilution of equity security holders.”38 
That day, the company’s stock fell again, from $1.42 to $1.00.39 
The third substantial disclosure occurred on February 25, when 
WCG revealed that it was considering the potential benefits of 
Chapter Eleven reorganization.40 After this announcement, WCG’s 
stock fell by 61.6% to close at $0.22 per share.41 Finally, on April 22, 
after the closing bell rang, WCG filed for bankruptcy.42 The next 
trading day WCG’s stock price closed at $0.06—a 67.3% drop from 
the day before.43 During this same period, the Telecom Index had 
shrunk to 148.94, 12% percent of its March 10, 2000, high.44 
B. The Daubert Challenge and Summary Judgment at the  
District Court 
The disposition of Williams hinges on the district court’s rulings 
over a Daubert challenge and a summary judgment motion. These 
motions resulted in a combined filing of 212 motions, briefs, 
 
 33. Id. at 1225. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. (reporting net of market and industry effects). 
 36. Id. at 1225–26. 
 37. Id. at 1226. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 1227. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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exhibits, and appendices totaling more than 36,650 pages.45 The 
defendants’ Daubert challenge was based, in part,46 on a perceived 
failure of one of the plaintiffs’ proposed expert witnesses to reliably 
prove loss causation as required under the standard recently clarified 
by the Supreme Court in Dura.47 The defendants’ success on the 
Daubert motion was a prerequisite to their success on the motion for 
summary judgment as to loss causation. 
In an effort to prove loss causation, Dr. Nye (the plaintiffs’ 
expert) presented two48 loss causation scenarios. The first scenario 
was based on a “leakage” theory.49 Under this theory, nearly the 
entire decline in WCG’s stock price was ascribed to the gradual 
“leaking” of WCG’s alleged fraud into the market.50 This theory 
presumed that the market had not been alerted to the fraud prior to 
January 29, 2002.51 The leakage theory attributed shareholder losses 
to the “materialization of the concealed risks, specifically that WCG’s 
assets were overstated, that WCG was in default of its debt 
covenants, and that there was significant uncertainty about WCG’s 
ability to continue as a going concern.”52 According to the theory, 
WCG’s true value was its trading price on the day the company 
declared bankruptcy.53 However, because the leakage theory failed to 
account for other “obvious alternative explanations,”54 the district 
court found that it was an unreliable method for proving loss 
causation.55 
Dr. Nye’s second loss causation scenario rested on a “corrective 
disclosure” theory. This theory focused on price declines following 
 
 45. Id. at 1204. 
 46. Id. at 1253 n.36. 
 47. Id. at 1252–53. 
 48. Dr. Nye actually prepared three loss causation scenarios, but Scenario 2 and 
Alternative Scenario 2 contained no differences “with respect to the matters which the court 
[found] to be dispositive.” Id. at 1261. 
 49. Id. at 1253–58. 
 50. Id. at 1253–54. 
 51. Id. at 1256–57. 
 52. In re Williams Sec. Litig.—WCG Subclass, 558 F.3d 1130, 1134–35 (10th Cir. 
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 53. In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1254. 
 54. Id. at 1266–67. “He fails to differentiate between losses rooted in causes cognizable 
under loss causation doctrine, on one hand, and, on the other hand, losses attributable to 
industry-specific stresses, the meltdown in the telecommunications sector, and other negative 
developments unrelated to the alleged fraud.” Id. at 1266. 
 55. Id. at 1267. 
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four specific public announcements: WMB’s January 29, 2002, press 
release announcing the delay of its earnings report; the February 4, 
2002, revelation by WCG that it may be in default; WCG’s February 
25, 2002, announcement concerning the possibility of the company 
filing bankruptcy; and WCG filing for Chapter Eleven bankruptcy 
protection on April 23, 2002.56 Under the corrective disclosure 
theory, the drop in value after each corrective disclosure was credited 
to the revelation of fraud.57 Dr. Nye asserted that, although these 
“partial disclosures” did not precisely mirror the alleged 
misrepresentations, they nonetheless “revealed the risks that had 
been concealed by the prior misrepresentations and omissions.”58 
Thus, the four corrective disclosures represented the materialization 
of the concealed risks and, therefore, caused the shareholders’ losses.  
The district court excluded Dr. Nye’s testimony regarding the 
corrective disclosure theory on the grounds that it was unreliable 
under Daubert.59 Specifically, the court found that this theory failed 
to establish that “any material, new, company-specific, and fraud-
related information became available to the efficient market on 
January 29, 2002, or on the three subsequent corrective disclosure 
dates proposed by plaintiffs.”60 Accordingly, the court found that 
there was no “triable issue as to loss causation,” and therefore 
entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants.61 The 
plaintiffs appealed both the Daubert ruling and the court’s grant of 
summary judgment. 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Dura  
The importance of Williams is found where Daubert and its 
progeny intersect with Dura. Dura establishes the level of causation 
plaintiffs must prove in order to bring a securities fraud claim; 
Daubert helps govern the reliability of proffered expert testimony. 
Thus, for a plaintiff’s expert to testify on the issue of loss causation 
(and meet the requirements of Dura), he must first pass Daubert 
 
 56. Id. at 1225–27, 1258. 
 57. Id. at 1269. 
 58. Id. at 1269 n.53 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59. Id. at 1270. 
 60. Id. at 1269. 
 61. Id. at 1294–95. 
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scrutiny. Understanding the interplay of these two doctrines is 
necessary to fully appreciate the impact of Williams. 
The basic elements of a federal securities fraud action include (1) 
a material misstatement or omission, (2) scienter, (3) a connection 
between the misstatement or omission and the purchase or sale of a 
security, (4) reliance, (5) economic loss, and (6) loss causation.62 The 
last of these elements, loss causation, was addressed by the Supreme 
Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo.63 
In Dura, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, a 
pharmaceutical company and various individuals, made false 
statements about the profitability of certain drugs and the future 
FDA approval of a new product.64 Plaintiffs further alleged that these 
misrepresentations caused them to purchase the defendant’s stock at 
an artificially inflated price.65 The Court concluded that, contrary to 
the “price inflation” theory, plaintiffs could not meet their burden of 
proving that a defendant’s fraud caused an economic loss merely by 
demonstrating that the plaintiffs purchased stock at an artificially 
inflated price.66 The court noted that loss causation—the “causal 
connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss”—is 
established by showing that the disclosure of “the relevant truth” 
resulted in a loss attributable to “the earlier misrepresentation.”67 In 
effect, Dura did away with the price inflation theory by unanimously 
labeling it insufficient.68 However, while Dura explained what form 
of pleading was inadequate, it did not go so far as to say what level 
of detail would be sufficient to show loss causation. 
Decisions interpreting Dura prove helpful in determining what a 
plaintiff must allege in order to meet Dura’s loss causation pleading 
standard. Based on lower court decisions, plaintiffs can meet Dura’s 
standards in two ways. The first is by adequately demonstrating that 
the plaintiffs’ losses were caused by the corrective disclosure of a 
previously concealed truth.69 Under this approach, plaintiffs must 
 
 62. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 339. 
 65. Id. at 340. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 342–43. 
 68. Id. at 348. 
 69. See, e.g., Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Rouhana (In re Winstar Commc’ns.), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 7618 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2006); In re eSpeed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 457 F. Supp. 2d 266 
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show that the price of a corporation’s stock dropped in response to a 
public disclosure that revealed a prior fraudulent misrepresentation 
or omission regarding the value of that security.70 Additionally, a 
plaintiff proceeding under a corrective disclosure theory must 
differentiate between disclosures relating to fraud and any other 
negative company- or industry-specific information simultaneously 
revealed (often referred to as “multiple causation.”) Where there is 
an industry-wide catastrophe accompanied by an immense flow of 
negative information (unrelated to fraud) about the industry and 
company in question, the non-fraud “contributing forces must be 
isolated and removed.”71 Thus, by isolating the non-fraud forces 
from the corrective disclosure, a plaintiff can establish the causal 
connection between the revelation of fraud and his losses. 
Under the second, alternative method of proving loss causation, 
the plaintiffs may allege materialization of the concealed risk. Using 
this model, plaintiffs must show that the defendants’ misstatements 
or omissions concealed risks that later materialized (in a way other 
than by a public corrective disclosure) to cause the plaintiffs’ losses.72 
Although Dura did not expressly describe the concept of 
materialization of the risk as a substitute for corrective disclosure, the 
Supreme Court did recognize the possibility that there could be 
cases in which the “relevant truth begins to leak out.”73 This 
approach, however, does not do away with Dura’s requirement that 
the plaintiffs must establish a causal connection between the 
misrepresentation and the loss: if a plaintiff asserts that the fraud 
surfaced through disclosure of another event (which caused the 
concealed risk to materialize), then the plaintiff “must provide proof 
that the market recognized a relationship between the event 
disclosed and the fraud.”74 Under both approaches, this causal 
connection is usually shown with the help of expert witnesses.75 An 
expert witness, though, must be able to pass Daubert scrutiny. 
 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18448 
(D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2005). 
 70. Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 71. Id. at 1447 n.5. 
 72. In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007). 
 73. Dura, 544 U.S. at 342. 
 74. McKowan Lowe & Co. v. Jasmine, Ltd., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32164, at *26–27 
(D.N.J. June 30, 2005). 
 75. Robbins, 116 F.3d at 1447 n.5. 
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B. Daubert 
Since the Federal Rules of Evidence were amended in 2000, 
district judges have been entrusted with the duty to serve as 
evidentiary “gatekeepers.”76 This gatekeeping function is meant to 
prevent juries from hearing irrelevant and unreliable expert 
testimony.77 In essence, the trial judge is required to “assess the 
reasoning and methodology underlying the expert’s opinion, and 
determine whether it is scientifically valid and applicable to a 
particular set of facts.”78 This is accomplished by subjecting the 
proffered expert testimony to a Daubert analysis. 
As an integral part of any Daubert analysis, a trial judge must 
determine the relevance of the proposed expert testimony.79 As 
explained in the Federal Rules of Evidence, “‘[r]elevant evidence’ 
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”80 
Thus, even when proffered expert testimony is reliable, it is to be 
excluded if it does not have “sufficient bearing on the issue at 
hand.”81 
In addition to making relevance determinations, Daubert 
scrutiny also addresses the reliability of proffered expert testimony.82 
To assess reliability, the court must determine whether an expert’s 
conclusions are the result of “(i) application of that expertise using 
recognized and supportable methodologies, (ii) on the basis of 
adequate data which is (iii) rationally tied to the opinions which 
purport to be based on that data.”83 By way of assistance, the 
Supreme Court in Daubert enumerated several nonexclusive factors 
that the district court may consider in making a determination as to 
 
 76. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 77. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–90. 
 78. Goebel v. Denver and Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 
2000). 
 79. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. 
 80. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 81. Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 391 F.3d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 82. FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590; Ralston v. Smith & Nephew 
Richards, Inc., 275 F.3d 965, 969 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 83. In re Williams Sec. Litig.—WCG Subclass, 496 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1235 (2007); see 
also FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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reliability: (1) whether the theory is susceptible to an objective 
challenge, (2) “whether the theory or technique has been subjected 
to peer review and publication,” (3) the “known or potential rate of 
error” associated with the methodology employed, and (4) whether 
the theory has been generally accepted in the scientific community.84 
This list is not exhaustive, and the district court has broad discretion 
to consider a variety of other factors.85  
When subjecting proffered expert testimony to a Daubert 
analysis, “‘any step that renders the analysis unreliable . . . renders 
the expert’s testimony inadmissible. This is true whether the step 
completely changes a reliable methodology or merely misapplies that 
methodology.’”86 A successful Daubert challenge, if made to exclude 
expert testimony regarding a necessary element of the proponent’s 
case, may result in an entry of summary judgment as a matter of 
law.87  
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
On appeal from the Northern District of Oklahoma, the Tenth 
Circuit considered whether the district court abused its discretion in 
granting summary judgment to the Williams defendants after 
excluding the plaintiffs’ expert witness’s testimony concerning loss 
causation on the grounds that it was unreliable under Daubert.88 
After considering two scenarios offered by the plaintiffs’ expert 
witness, the Tenth Circuit found that the plaintiffs “failed to identify 
a causal nexus between the revelation of the previously-concealed 
truth and the decline in value of WCG securities.”89 Without a 
showing “that their losses were caused by a revelation of the fraud 
and not some [other] non-compensable” factor, the plaintiffs did not 
adequately answer the issue of loss causation as required by Dura.90 
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit affirmed both the district court’s 
 
 84. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. 
 85. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999). 
 86. Mitchell v. Gencorp, Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 782 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 
717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 87. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142–43 (1997). 
 88. In re Williams Sec. Litig.—WCG Subclass, 558 F.3d 1130, 1136 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 89. Id. at 1143. 
 90. Id. 
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exclusion of the expert testimony and the grant of summary 
judgment.91 
A. Loss Causation: Scenario One—Leakage and Materialization of the 
Concealed Risks 
In reviewing the district court’s exclusion of Dr. Nye’s 
testimony, the circuit court first considered whether the trial court 
properly excluded Scenario One as a basis for loss causation. Under 
Scenario One, the plaintiffs’ expert first attempted to prove loss 
causation on a leakage theory.92 The plaintiffs’ expert put forth the 
idea that the relevant truth regarding WCG’s alleged fraud gradually 
leaked into the market—as opposed to a “full and immediate 
disclosure”—which caused the corporation’s stock price to fall.93 As 
it would do with a corrective disclosure theory, the court considered 
whether the plaintiffs had linked the revelation of the alleged fraud 
to actual losses: it is not enough to say, “Well, the market must have 
known.”94 This is essentially what the plaintiffs’ expert argued under 
his first theory. 
Under the leakage theory, Dr. Nye asserted that, within the class 
period, “a number of tiny corrective disclosures occurred each and 
every day . . . which had the cumulative [result] of gradually 
revealing the fraud.”95 In support of this theory, Dr. Nye “submitted 
a 1300-page compendium of news articles, reports, and SEC filings 
that was supposed to show ‘numerous instances of leakage of 
corrective information concerning WCG’s true financial 
condition.’”96 The Tenth Circuit pointed out, however, that the 
majority of these clippings either pertained to the 
telecommunications industry as a whole or contained positive 
statements about WCG.97 Because none of the announcements 
revealed anything negative about WCG particularly, the circuit court 
found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting 
the leakage theory.98 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 1137. 
 93. Id. at 1138. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/6/2010 2:19 PM 
215 How Dura Met Daubert 
 227 
In response to the court’s dismissal of the leakage theory, the 
plaintiffs contended that Scenario One was developed, instead, to 
support loss causation based on the theory of materialization of the 
concealed risks.99 Plaintiffs argued that the primary purpose of 
Scenario One was not that any specific disclosure notified the market 
of fraud, but, rather, that the “[p]laintiffs’ losses were caused by the 
materialization of the concealed risks . . . .”100 While the court 
acknowledged that materialization of the concealed risks is a viable 
theory, it had a problem with this justification because Dr. Nye failed 
to identify any specific occasion within the class period when these 
concealed risks actually materialized.101 The court reminded the 
plaintiffs that such a theory “would still have to identify when the 
materialization occurred and link it to a corresponding loss.”102  
Ultimately, the appellate court found Scenario One an unreliable 
method for proving loss causation because it failed to specifically 
identify the losses attributable to fraud. Instead, the first loss scenario 
assumed that any decline in WCG stock was attributable to the 
revelation of fraud.103 The Tenth Circuit noted that this approach 
failed to “differentiate between losses rooted in causes cognizable 
under loss causation doctrine, on one hand, and, on the other hand, 
losses attributable to industry-specific stresses, the meltdown in the 
telecommunications sector, and other negative developments 
unrelated to the alleged fraud.”104 Thus, Scenario One could not be 
used by the plaintiffs to prove loss causation due to its unreliability 
under Daubert. 
B. Loss Causation: Scenario Two—Corrective Disclosures 
Even though Scenario One was the plaintiffs’ preferred loss 
causation theory, they also provided an alternate theory.105 Scenario 
Two identified four specific corrective disclosures that occurred 
during the class period: WMB’s January 29, 2002, press release 
announcing the delay of its earnings report; the February 4, 2002, 
revelation by WCG that it may be in default; WCG’s February 25, 
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2002, announcement concerning the possibility of the company 
filing bankruptcy; and WCG actually filing for Chapter Eleven 
bankruptcy protection on April 25, 2002.106 The court added that 
the disclosure, to be corrective, did not have to “precisely mirror the 
earlier misrepresentation, but it must at least relate back to the 
misrepresentation and not to some other negative information about 
the company.”107 Thus, the question became whether “the risk that 
caused the loss was within the zone of risk concealed by the 
misrepresentations and omissions alleged by a disappointed 
investor.”108 
In analyzing the reliability of Scenario Two, the appellate court 
examined each of the four disclosures. The court needed to 
determine if the information they revealed was sufficiently within the 
zone of risk. This was necessary to support Dr. Nye’s conclusion that 
it was the revelation of fraud, and not other non-compensatory 
factors, that caused the subsequent declines in WCG’s stock price.109 
1. January 29, 2002, corrective disclosure 
Dr. Nye identified the January 29 press release as the first 
corrective disclosure.110 On this occasion, WMB announced a delay 
in the release of its fourth quarter financial statements while the 
company reviewed the status of certain contingent liabilities it had 
with respect to WCG.111 Following this announcement, the share 
price fell from $1.63 to $1.34.112 Dr. Nye admitted that this was not 
a significant negative return for that day given the fact that the 
market as a whole fell 2.5% and the industry was down as well.113 
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that an announcement that WCG 
could be in default may fall within the zone of risk concealed by the 
alleged misrepresentations, but questioned whether Dr. Nye’s basis 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1140. 
 108. Id. (quoting Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(original emphasis omitted)). 
 109. Id. at 1140–43. 
 110. In the heading on page 1140, the court labeled this disclosure as “January 29, 
2009.” Id. at 1140. The remainder of the opinion, however, makes it clear that the actual date 
of disclosure must have been January 29, 2002, as it clearly preceded the February 4, 2002, 
disclosure. Id. at 1140–43. 
 111. Id. at 1140–42. 
 112. Id. at 1140–41. 
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for asserting that the January 29 press release revealed any new 
information to the market that would make that day’s losses 
attributable to the disclosure.114 The court also quickly pointed out 
that, on that same day, Milberg Weiss filed its Cali complaint 
identifying the same misrepresentations. This suggests that the 
market already had at least some knowledge of the fraud.115 With at 
least one other major piece of negative information having been 
released on the same day, the court lacked a detailed analysis by Dr. 
Nye showing why all the losses from that day should be attributed to 
the press release (and its assumed revelation of fraud) and nothing 
else.116 
2. February 4, 2002, corrective disclosure 
The second corrective disclosure identified by Dr. Nye occurred 
on February 4. That day’s press release made two announcements: 
(1) WCG had been informed by its lenders that it may be in default, 
and (2) WCG was reviewing the potential impairment of its long-
lived assets.117 As with the January 29 announcement, Dr. Nye 
credited the entire decline in WCG’s stock price that day to the press 
release without first considering the effect other non-fraudulent 
factors might have had.118 In fact, the court notes, the press release 
itself revealed a significant piece of information unrelated to fraud: 
WCG was performing a review of the possible impairment of its 
long-lived assets.119 Dr. Nye did not provide an explanation as to 
why the entire February 4 decline should be ascribed to fraud and 
not to other information also revealed that day.120 
3. February 25 and April 22, 2002, corrective disclosures 
The last two corrective disclosures were WCG’s announcement 
on February 25 that it was considering Chapter Eleven bankruptcy 
and the company’s actual filing of bankruptcy on April 22.121 The 
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plaintiffs argued that bankruptcy was within the zone of risk 
concealed by the earlier alleged misrepresentations and, therefore, 
the losses following these announcements could fairly be attributed 
to the revelation of fraud.122 The appellate court disagreed: “The 
alleged misstatements involved the risks of defaulting on debt and 
the true reasons that WCG was spun off from WMB; they did not 
involve the certainty of a bankruptcy.”123 The court noted that 
bankruptcy might have been a possibility—even a probability—from 
the moment WCG was spun off.124 Expressing doubt as to Dr. Nye’s 
conclusions, the court asserted, “[T]here are simply too many 
potential intervening causes to say that bankruptcy was WCG’s 
legally foreseeable destiny such that its trading price at bankruptcy 
equaled its true value on the day the spinoff was announced.”125  
As with Scenario One, the appellate court found that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in finding Scenario Two was based 
on an unreliable methodology for proving loss causation.126 In so 
doing, the court noted that Dr. Nye himself failed to link the four 
disclosures to any of the alleged misrepresentations;127 he neglected 
to discuss why these particular disclosures should be considered 
“corrective;”128 and he did not account for any potential non-fraud 
related information that could have also affected WCG’s value.129 In 
light of these findings, the Tenth Circuit determined that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected the second loss 
causation scenario as unreliable under Daubert.130  
C. Summary Judgment 
The plaintiffs argued that, even if the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in excluding Dr. Nye’s testimony, it improperly granted 
summary judgment.131 They contended that there was still a genuine 
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issue of material fact as to loss causation and that a jury should 
decide the question.132 Unconvinced, the appellate court commented 
that, given the evidence presented, there was “simply no way for a 
juror to determine whether the alleged fraud caused any portion of 
Plaintiffs’ loss.”133 Since the plaintiffs were unable to meet their 
burden under Dura, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment as to the issue of loss causation.134 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Williams has several significant 
implications for securities fraud plaintiffs. First, Williams clarifies the 
contours of Dura’s loss causation requirements and provides a 
warning to securities fraud plaintiffs that courts may exclude expert 
testimony that neither passes Daubert scrutiny nor meets Dura’s 
pleading requirements. Second, Williams established that plaintiffs 
carry a relatively hefty evidentiary burden in order to proceed on a 
securities fraud claim, which is in harmony with the language of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the Act”), as well as the 
reasoning and policy driving the Supreme Court’s decision in Dura. 
A. Williams’s Warning 
Although Dura rejected the price inflation theory as an adequate 
basis for proving loss causation, it did not set the precise level of 
proof required by plaintiffs in order to satisfy their loss causation 
burden. Williams clarified this uncertainty within the Tenth Circuit 
by holding that plaintiffs, regardless of the loss causation theory they 
use, must (1) disentangle any potential non-fraud factors from those 
revealing the alleged misrepresentations or omissions and (2) link the 
disclosure of the truth regarding the alleged misrepresentations or 
omissions to a subsequent loss.135  
Because Williams’s application of Dura’s standards requires 
plaintiffs to present affirmative evidence as to loss causation, event 
studies will most assuredly become common place in securities fraud 
litigation. Without such studies, it will be impossible for plaintiffs to 
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adequately link for the jury—or trial judges performing their 
gatekeeping function—the public disclosure of the alleged fraud to a 
subsequent loss, and to isolate from the tangle of possible factors the 
portion of the loss actually attributable to the revelation of the 
alleged fraud.  
Given the defendants’ success in Williams, the loss causation 
experts retained and the event studies prepared in anticipation of 
litigation will increasingly become the subject of Daubert challenges. 
Defendants making such a challenge can allege that experts are 
unqualified as to the area of loss causation or that their testimony is 
unreliable and inadmissible under Daubert. Plaintiffs must be sure 
that the statistical methodology underlying their expert analysis 
conforms to the standards pronounced by Daubert and its progeny. 
This task includes ensuring that the expert has properly isolated the 
effects of the revelation of fraud on stock price from other possible 
factors. Neglecting to do so is to follow the path trod by the 
plaintiffs in Williams and risk an adverse finding on summary 
judgment. 
B. Williams’s Burden 
In Williams, the Tenth Circuit established a relatively heavy 
evidentiary burden for plaintiffs on the issue of loss causation. The 
court broke new ground at the appellate level by placing squarely 
upon the shoulders of plaintiffs not only the burden of proving that 
defendants committed fraud and the task of linking that fraud to a 
subsequent loss, but also the responsibility of producing affirmative 
evidence isolating the effects that the alleged fraud had on the stock 
price from other non-fraud factors possibly affecting the stock 
price.136 This requirement is consistent with the language of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the policy considerations 
announced in Dura. 
1. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 added 
Section 21D(b)(4) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.137 This 
section states, “In any private action arising under this chapter, the 
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plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of 
the defendant alleged to violate this chapter caused the loss for 
which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”138 The language of the 
Act does not expressly state which party bears the burden in cases 
involving multiple causation—which side must show the portion of 
the stock decline attributable to the fraudulent conduct, as opposed 
to other non-fraud factors—but the plain text of the statute makes it 
clear that the burden of proof in these types of cases should be on 
the plaintiff. 
If the language of the Act is to be given any weight, it is clear 
that the plaintiff has the burden of proof in cases dealing with 
multiple causation. The Act notes a very specific burden of proof: 
“[T]he plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the act or 
omission of the defendant . . . caused the loss . . . .”139 The language 
of the Act is unambiguous: the plaintiff carries the burden of proving 
that (1) the defendant committed an act or omission violative of the 
Act; (2) the plaintiff suffered a loss; and (3) the defendant’s act or 
omission caused the loss. Thus, it follows that, in order to prove it 
was the defendant’s act or omission that caused the loss, the plaintiff 
must also rule out other known possible causes of the loss. 
2. Dura’s policy considerations 
The Supreme Court has mentioned several times its continuing 
concern that securities laws not be transformed into an insurance 
policy.140 This consideration has been used in justifying the Court’s 
reasoning on several securities-related issues, not just loss 
causation.141 The Supreme Court reiterated in Dura that it did not 
want to create a broad insurance policy for investors out of securities 
laws.142 This suggests an initial presumption in multiple causation 
securities fraud cases that any decline in a stock’s price was caused by 
non-fraud factors. It follows, then, that in order to put the question 
of loss causation before a jury, plaintiffs should have to overcome 
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this presumption by presenting affirmative evidence to the contrary. 
That is, plaintiffs must present evidence that the revelation of a 
previous misrepresentation or omission, isolated from known non-
fraud factors, caused a certain drop in a stock’s price. Any rule that 
does not require plaintiffs to carry this burden assumes that because 
there was an act or omission violative of the Act, and because there 
was a decline in stock value, the decline was caused by the fraud; this 
approach effectively alters “loss causation” into “loss coincidence” 
and does just what the Supreme Court wanted to prevent: it 
transforms securities laws into an insurance policy. 
3. The Tenth Circuit 
The Tenth Circuit ultimately rested on a burden of proof 
standard that is in harmony with the language of the Act. Williams 
was the Tenth Circuit’s first case requiring an interpretation of 
Dura’s loss causation requirements and the first case among the 
circuits generally to do so in response to a Daubert challenge. Thus, 
it was up to the Tenth Circuit to set a persuasive precedent as to the 
burden of proof plaintiffs must meet in order to proceed to a jury for 
a multiple causation case. By placing the burden of loss causation 
fully on the plaintiffs, including the burden of showing which 
portion of a decline in share price is attributable to the revelation of 
previously concealed risks and which portion is attributable to other 
non-fraud related factors, Williams clearly follows the plain meaning 
of the Act. Under the Tenth Circuit’s approach, the plaintiff must 
appropriately show that the defendant “caused the loss for which the 
plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”143 
Additionally, the approach adopted in Williams takes into 
account the policy underlying Dura. A rule requiring plaintiffs to 
differentiate a decline in stock price due to fraud from a decline due 
to other factors holds defendants accountable only for losses caused 
by their allegedly fraudulent conduct. Thus, under the Tenth 
Circuit’s burden of proof standard, defendants are far less likely to be 
left holding the tab for losses not attributable to fraudulent conduct: 
only losses “fairly attributable to the public airing of the alleged 
fraud”144 are charged to the defendants.145 This prevents the 
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securities laws from being transformed into a broad insurance policy 
for investors, which is what Dura aimed to avoid. Under Williams, 
this concern is met by holding that an expert’s failure to account for 
other possible non-fraud factors constitutes unreliable methodology. 
As such, the expert witness cannot survive a Daubert challenge and 
the plaintiffs are unable to meet their burden of proof regarding loss 
causation.  
The Tenth Circuit adopted its burden of proof requirements in 
the face of the competing standards of various district courts. These 
other approaches ranged from placing on the defendant the burden 
of “severing the link” between the misrepresentation and the stock 
price (in effect creating a rebuttable presumption that the price 
decline was fraud related),146 to treating multiple causation as a fact-
intensive inquiry best resolved by the jury and not on summary 
judgment (in effect relieving the plaintiff, at the pleading stage, of 
the burden of isolating the effect of fraud-related factors on stock).147 
When compared to these approaches, it becomes even clearer that 
the Tenth Circuit’s loss causation requirements best support the 
language of the Act and the Supreme Court’s policy considerations. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Williams has many significant 
consequences for plaintiffs alleging securities fraud. First, Williams 
clarifies the contours of Dura’s loss causation requirements and 
provides a warning to securities fraud plaintiffs that courts may 
exclude expert testimony that does not pass Daubert scrutiny or 
meet Dura’s requirements. Further, Williams places the burden of 
proving loss causation squarely on the shoulders of plaintiffs, 
including the burden of accounting for the effect of possible non-
fraud factors on a company’s stock price. Plaintiffs within the reach 
of the Tenth Circuit wishing to avoid an unfavorable summary 
judgment decision should study Williams and meet the appropriate 
standards regarding loss causation in light of Dura and Daubert. 
 
 145. Dura, 544 U.S. at 345–46. 
 146. See In re Micron Techs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 247 F.R.D. 627, 635 (D. Idaho 2007). 
 147. Freeland v. Iridium World Commc’ns, Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59, 80 (D.D.C. 
2008). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/6/2010 2:19 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
236 
Bryan L. Phipps 
 
 
  J.D. candidate, April 2010, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University. 
